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Abstract
We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior
in games. Instead of using lexicographic beliefs to capture innitely less likely con-
jectures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide among strate-
gies that are outcome-equivalent given their conjectures. A player is event-rational
if she best responds to a conjecture and uses a list of subsets of the other players'
strategies to break ties among outcome-equivalent strategies. Using type spaces to
capture interactive beliefs, we show that common belief of event-rationality (RCBER)
implies that players play strategies in S1W, that is, admissible strategies that also
survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies (Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)). We
strengthen standard belief to validated belief and we show that event-rationality and
common validated belief of event-rationality (RCvBER) implies that players play it-
erated admissible strategies (IA). We show that in complete, continuous and compact
type structures, RCBER and RCvBER are nonempty, and hence we obtain epistemic
criteria for S1W and IA.
Keywords: Epistemic game theory; Admissibility; Iterated weak dominance; Com-
mon Knowledge; Rationality; Completeness.
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11 Introduction
As noted by Samuelson (1992) and many others, there is a potential problem in dealing with
common knowledge of admissibility in games, which is known as the inclusion-exclusion
problem. The reason is that a strategy is admissible if and only if it is a best response
to a conjecture with full support. If we capture knowledge by the support of the agent's
belief and assume that she is rational, that is, she optimizes given her belief, then playing
an admissible strategy implies that she must necessarily consider all strategies of the other
players as possible, including the strategies that are not admissible. So she cannot believe
that her opponents play admissible strategies because she cannot exclude from consideration
their inadmissible strategies.
Recently, Brandenburger et al. (2008), henceforth BFK, provided a way of dealing with
the inclusion-exclusion issue, by using lexicographic probability systems (LPS) and the notion
of assumption in the place of certainty. Roughly speaking, a player with conjectures that form
an LPS can have a fully supported conjecture while \assuming" certain events that are not
equal to the whole state space. BFK show that common assumption of admissibility (RCAR)
characterizes iterated admissibility (IA), but RCAR is empty in complete and continuous
type structures. So BFK do not provide an epistemic characterization of IA. Keisler and Lee
(2011) and Yang (2009) have recently extended BFK's analysis and obtained nonemptiness
of RCAR. The former allows for discontinuous type mappings, and the latter uses a weaker
notion of assumption.
We propose an alternative route. Instead of an LPS-based analysis, we use event-
rationality to allow for players to break ties with lists of subsets of opponents' strategies.
That is, we use a dierent notion of rationality: the LPS-based approaches assume that
players are lexicographic expected utility maximizers. We assume that players are event-
rational. The two notions of rationality equally describe admissible behavior. The dierence
comes into play in the analysis of interactive beliefs. Interactive beliefs are described by type
spaces. In our framework, a type of a player determines her beliefs over the strategies and
types of the other players (as in the standard framework) and in addition it determines the
tie-breaking list that the (event-rational) type uses. As a result, common belief of event-
rationality does not run into the tension of having to exclude and include the same event.
In contrast, in an LPS-based analysis a type of a player determines her lexicographic be-
liefs over the strategies and types of the other players, and the inclusion-exclusion tension is
2avoided by the use of \assumption" in the place of certainty. Under our approach, we pro-
vide epistemic foundations for both the solution concept proposed by Dekel and Fudenberg
(1990) (S1W) and iterated admissibility (IA).
We consider nite two-player games in strategic form. The two players are Ann and
Bob, denoted by superscripts \a" and \b". In order to provide some intuition about event-
rationality, note that if a strategy sa of Ann's is rational then it is a best response to some
conjecture, v 2 (Sb), where Sb is the set of Bob's strategies. If sa is inadmissible and
therefore weakly dominated by some (mixed) strategy a, then sa and a give the same
payo for all strategies of Bob on the support of v while a is strictly better than sa for
all conjectures with support on the complement of the support of v. Hence, whenever Ann
chooses an admissible strategy, it is as if she optimizes given her conjecture, as usual, but
when she is totally indierent between two strategies she compares them using a measure
with support on the dierence between Sb and the support of her conjecture. We say that
she \breaks ties" using the event that is the complement of her support (with respect to Sb).
In other words, Ann is condent in trusting her belief, just like any other rational agent.
But if two of her strategies are outcome-equivalent under her belief, she chooses the one that
is also optimal under a measure with support being the complement of the support of her
belief.
There is nothing particular about breaking ties with respect to the complement of her
support when dening event-rationality. Ann can conceivably break ties using any other set,
as long as it is outside her current frame, that is, disjoint from the support of her belief.1
Furthermore, Ann need not use a single such tie-breaking set. She may well have many such
sets, each providing extra validation for her chosen strategy.
The principle behind event-rationality is, therefore, the following: if two strategies are
outcome-equivalent given Ann's conjecture, then Ann has no way of deciding among them
within her frame of mind: the two strategies yield the same outcome for whichever strategy
of Bob she considers possible. Ann must, therefore, resort to information beyond her frame
to make a decision. She could, for instance, ip coins, that is, resort to fully external means.
But in doing so Ann would be neglecting information about her two strategies, contained in
1But note that, for the purpose of breaking ties, it suces to consider only subsets of Bob's strategies.
In particular, when we introduce the formal model of interactive beliefs, it is without loss to assume that
Ann uses only lists of Bob's strategies to break ties, because lists that include the types of Bob only matter
for breaking ties through the strategies of Bob that they are related to.
3how they fare against strategies of Bob that are considered impossible by Ann's conjecture.
Event-rationality postulates that Ann does not neglect this information. Moreover, in doing
so, she does not change what she thinks about Bob's choices.
Turn now to interactive beliefs, captured by type structures. Let T a and T b be the sets
of types of Ann and Bob. A type ta 2 T a determines Ann's conjectures over Bob's choices,
Ann's beliefs over Bob's types and so on, together with the tie-breaking list used by Ann. A
state for Ann is a strategy-type pair (sa;ta) and her beliefs over Bob are given by her beliefs
over Sb  T b. A strategy-type pair (sa;ta) of Ann's is called event-rational if sa is optimal
given ta's conjecture and breaks ties for all sets in ta's tie-breaking list. Event-rationality
and common belief of event-rationality is then captured as the intersection of innitely many
events: Ann is event-rational, and so is Bob; Ann is certain that Bob is event-rational and
Bob is certain that Ann is event-rational. And so on. This yields our RCBER ((Event)
Rationality and Common Belief of Event Rationality) set of states.
Event-rationality captures the idea of choosing a strategy with extra validation, in the
sense that a strategy has to be optimal under one's conjecture, but also pass a series of
validating tie-breaking tests. We also introduce the idea of extra validation of a belief.
Consider a type ta that believes that an event E 2 Sb  T b is true, and is associated with a
list ` of subsets of Sb. The belief on the event E will be validated by the list ` if there is an
element of the list, say Eb 2 `, that is equal to the projection of E on Sb.
Event-rationality and common validated belief of event-rationality is again captured as
the intersection of innitely many events: Ann and Bob are event-rational. Ann has a
validated belief that Bob is event-rational and Bob has a validated belief that Ann is event-
rational. And so on. This yields our RCvBER ((Event) Rationality and Common validated
Belief of Event Rationality) set of states.
Our results are as follows. We characterize the strategies that are compatible with
RCBER by a solution concept, hypo-admissible sets (HAS), which is related to the self-
admissible sets (SAS) of BFK but it is neither weaker or stronger. In a complete structure,
RCBER produces the set of strategies that survive one round of elimination of inadmissi-
ble strategies followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (S1W). We
characterize RCvBER with a solution concept we call hypo-iteratively admissible sets (HIA).
In a complete type structure, the resulting set of strategies is precisely the set of iterated
admissible strategies (IA). We then show that strategies played under RCvBER constitute
an SAS, but the converse is not necessarily true. Because BFK have shown that every SAS is
4the implication of RCAR in some type structure, the RCvBER construction is more restric-
tive than the RCAR construction of BFK. Nevertheless, we show that the RCBER and the
RCvBER are nonempty whenever the type structure is complete, continuous and compact,
therefore providing epistemic criteria for S1W and IA.
Our approach provides an alternative and eective perspective to deal with common
\knowledge" of admissibility in games. A solution to the inclusion-exclusion problem is
obtained by using event-rationality together with having Sb (from Ann's perspective) as
one of the tie-breaking sets. LPS-based approaches also obtain a solution to the inclusion-
exclusion problem. But some conclusions coming from the LPS-based approach are functions
of the notions of rationality and beliefs adopted by the approach. For instance, from BFK
and Keisler and Lee (2011) we get that either continuity or completeness have to be dropped
for an epistemic characterization of IA to be obtained. Our results show that, using a
dierent notion of rationality, neither continuity nor completeness have to be dropped for
such a characterization to be obtained. We should also note that completeness captures the
idea that players have no prior knowledge about each other, so it is a desirable property in
an epistemic analysis. And continuity is a consequence of the (universal) construction of
beliefs about beliefs (c.f. Mertens and Zamir (1985)).
1.1 Related Literature
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) argue that common knowledge of rationality implies (in
terms of behavior) the iteratively undominated (IU) set, that is, the set of strategy proles
surviving iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies. Tan and Werlang (1988) pro-
vides epistemic conditions for UI by characterizing RCBR (rationality and common belief
of rationality). Admissibility, or the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies, has a long
history in decision and game theory (see Wald (1939), Luce and Raia (1957) and Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986)). However, Samuelson (1992) shows that common knowledge of admis-
sibility is not equivalent to iterated admissibility and does not always exist. Foundations for
the S1W strategies (Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)) are provided by B orgers (1994) (using
approximate common knowledge), Brandenburger (1992) (using lexicographic probability
systems (Blume et al. (1991)) and 0-level belief) and Ben-Porath (1997) (in extensive form
games). Stahl (1995) denes the notion of lexicographic rationalizability and shows that it
is equivalent to iterated admissibility.
5BFK use lexicographic probability systems and characterize rationality and common as-
sumption of rationality (RCAR) by the solution concept of self-admissible sets. They show
that rationality and m-th order assumption of rationality is characterized by the strategies
that survive m + 1 rounds of elimination of inadmissible strategies, in complete type struc-
tures.2 Finally, RCAR is empty in a complete and continuous lexicographic type structure
when the agent is not indierent. Hence, although the IA set can be captured by RmAR
(rationality and m-th order assumption of rationality) for big enough m (note that games
are nite), BFK do not provide an epistemic criterion for IA. Keisler and Lee (2011) show
that the emptiness of RCAR can be overcome if one drops continuity. Yang (2009) provides
an epistemic criterion for IA, with an analogous version of BFK's RCAR, that makes use
of a weaker notion of \assumption". The message from Keisler and Lee (2011) and Yang
(2009), is that continuity strengthens the notion of caution implied by fully supported LPS.
The notion of caution implied by event-rationality is independent of continuity.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we illustrate the dierences
between the various notions of rationality and belief through examples. In Sections 3 and
4 we set up the framework and provide the relevant denitions, including event-rationality,
RCBER and RCvBER. In Section 5 we characterize RCBER and show that RmBER (m
rounds of mutual belief) generates S1W, for big enough m. In Section 6 we characterize
RCvBER, show that it is more restrictive than RCAR of BFK and show that RmvBER
generates the IA set, for big enough m. In Section 7 we show that RCBER and RCvBER
are always nonempty in compact, complete and continuous type structures, therefore pro-
viding epistemic criteria for S1W and IA. Finally, the Appendix provides decision theoretic
foundations for event-rationality and validated beliefs.
2 Examples
In order to illustrate the dierences between the BFK approach and that of the present
paper, consider the following game from Samuelson (1992) and BFK. There are two players,
Ann and Bob.
2See Section 6.1 for the formal denition of \assumption".
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L R
1 U 1;1 0;1
[1] D 0;2 1;0
From the literature we know that rationality and common belief of rationality (RCBR)
is characterized by the best response sets (BRS) and, in a complete structure, the strategies
that survive iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies.3 Can we get a similar result
for the admissible strategies and the iteratively admissible strategies if we modify the notions
of belief and of rationality? Recall that a strategy is admissible if and only if it is a best
response to a full support measure (no action of the other player is excluded). Then, the
obvious solution is to specify that rationality incorporates full support beliefs.
But such a specication does not always work. In the game above, if Ann is rational, she
assigns positive probability to Bob playing L and R. If Bob is rational, he assigns positive
probability to Ann playing U and D. Hence, Bob plays L. If Ann knows that Bob is rational,
she assigns positive probability only on Bob playing L. But then, Ann is not rational! In
other words, the modied RCBR set is empty for this game.
One solution is obtained using lexicographic beliefs. Suppose Ann's primary hypothesis
assigns probability 1 to Bob playing L, and her secondary hypothesis assigns probability 1 to
Bob playing R. Bob's primary hypothesis assigns 1 on U and his secondary hypothesis assigns
1 on D. Then, Bob playing L is rational because he is indierent between L and R given
his primary measure, but strictly prefers L given his secondary measure.4 Ann playing U is
rational because U is the best response given her primary measure. She assumes that Bob
is rational, because she considers Bob playing L innitely more likely than Bob playing R.5
Similarly, Bob assumes that Ann is rational. As a result, rationality and common assumption
of rationality (RCAR) is nonempty.
A similar result can be obtained if we use the denition of event-rationality in the context
of standard type structures. Suppose Ann's belief assigns probability 1 to Bob playing L and
Bob's belief  assigns probability 1 to Ann playing U. Moreover, Bob has the set Sansupp 
3Qa  Qb is a BRS if each sa 2 Qa is strongly undominated with respect to Sa  Qb and likewise for b.
4That is, the associated sequence of payos under L is lexicographically greater than the sequence under
R.
5For more information on the notions of \assumption" and \innitely more likely", see BFK.
7in his tie-breaking list. Bob playing L is event-rational because he plays best response given
his beliefs and, although L and R are outcome-equivalent under his support, L is better
under a conjecture with support Sa n supp . Similarly, Ann is event-rational since, under
her conjecture, she does not need to break ties. Finally, Ann believes that Bob is event-
rational and Bob believes that Ann is event-rational. Hence, rationality and common belief
of event-rationality (RCBER) is nonempty.
In the game above RCAR and RCBER produce the same strategies because the IA and
the S1W sets are equal. However, this is not always true. Consider the following game
which illustrates the dierence between RCBER (which yields the S1W set) and RCvBER





Since D is strongly dominated, event-rational Ann will not play that strategy. In a
complete structure though, event-rational Ann will play U or M, while event-rational Bob
will play L or R. For example, Ann's type playing U is event-rational if she assigns probability
1 to Bob playing L. Ann's type playing M is also event-rational if she assigns probability 1 to
Bob playing R. Note that Ann never needs to break ties. Moreover, for both U and M there
are event-rational types of Ann's who assign positive probability to event-rational types of
Bob playing L or R. And similarly for Bob. In other words, these types of Ann believe the
event \Bob is event-rational", Bob's types believe the event \Ann is event-rational", and so
on for any nite order of beliefs about beliefs. Hence, event-rationality and common belief
of event-rationality (RCBER) yields the S1W set, fU;Mg  fL;Rg.
Suppose we repeat the same procedure but now impose a stronger form of belief. Take
an event E  Sb  T b, where Sb, T b is the set of Bob's strategies and types, respectively. A
type ta of Ann is associated with a belief over Sb  T b and a list ` of subsets of Sb. We say
that ta has a validated belief in an event E if it assigns probability 1 to E and there exists an
element Eb of the list ` that is equal to the projection of E on Sb. Imposing event-rationality
and common validated belief of event-rationality gives us RCvBER.
Which strategies are generated by RCvBER? The rst round of RCvBER yields the set
8of event-rational types for Ann and event-rational types for Bob, just like RCBER. But the
second round of RCvBER requires that each of Ann's types has a validated belief in the event
\Bob is rational", and similarly for Bob. Then, all types playing L are excluded. To see
this, note that if Bob is event-rational and has a validated belief in the event \Ann is event-
rational", then the strategies played by event-rational types of Ann's, namely fU;Mg, must
belong to his list. The only event-rational types of Bob playing L (and having a validated
belief that Ann is event-rational) are the ones that assign probability 1 on Ann playing M.
In order to have a validated belief in fU;Mg  T a
0, where T a
0 is Ann's event-rational types,
Bob must have U as a tie-breaking set in his list. Moreover, he assigns probability 1 to M
and therefore needs to break ties, because L and R are outcome equivalent given his support.
But L is never a best response for any conjecture with support on U. Hence, Bob, assigning
probability one on M, cannot have a validated belief that Ann is event-rational.
In the third round of RCvBER, Ann has a validated belief that Bob has a validated belief
that Ann is event-rational. This means that types of Ann's playing U are excluded, because
those types assign positive probability to Bob's types playing L, and none of them has a
validated belief that Ann is event-rational. The only event-rational types of Ann playing M
and of Bob playing R survive all rounds of RCvBER and generate the IA set, fMg  fRg.
3 Setup
Let (Sa;Sb;a;b) be a two-player nite strategic form game, with a : Sa  Sb ! R, and
similarly for b (as usual, a stands for Ann, and b stands for Bob). For any given topological
space X, let (X) denote the space of probability measures dened on the Borel subsets of
X, endowed with the weak* topology. We extend a to (Sa)  (Sb) in the usual way:
a(a;b) =
P
(sa;sb)2SaSb a(sa)b(sb)a(sa;sb). Similarly for b. A strategy sa 2 Sa is
a best response to a conjecture v 2 (Sb) if a(sa;v)  a(^ sa;v) for every ^ sa 2 Sa. It is
denoted by sa 2 BRa(v). Similarly for b.
3.1 Admissibility and Event-Rationality
The following denition and Lemma are taken from BFK.
Denition 1. Fix X Y  SaSb. A strategy sa 2 X is weakly dominated with respect
to X  Y if there exists a 2 (Sa), with a(X) = 1, such that a(a;sb)  a(sa;sb) for
9every sb 2 Y and a(a;sb) > a(sa;sb) for some sb 2 Y . Otherwise, say sa is admissible
with respect to X  Y . If sa is admissible with respect to Sa  Sb, simply say that sa is
admissible.
Lemma 1. A strategy sa 2 X is admissible with respect to X Y if and only if there exists
b 2 (Sb), with supp b = Y , such that a(sa;b)  a(ra;b) for every ra 2 X.
Lexicographic beliefs have been used in dealing with the inclusion-exclusion issue iden-
tied by Samuelson (1992) (see BFK, Brandenburger (1992), Stahl (1995), Keisler and Lee
(2011) and Yang (2009)). We follow an alternative approach, based on \tie-breaking lists."
We stress that our approach is a way of capturing admissible behavior (Lemma 2 below.)
Admissible behavior can be viewed as the requirement that ties be broken by events outside
the conjecture of a player. This leads us to consider tie-breaking events, as follows.
By a list of subsets of Sb we mean a collection ` = fF1;:::;Fkg, with Fi  Sb for
every i = 1;:::;k, for some k  1, with the property that Fi 6= Fj for every distinct pair
i;j 2 f1;:::;kg. The collection of all such lists, Lb, is a set of nite cardinality, because Sb is
a nite set. Similarly for b, with lists ` of distinct subsets of Sa denoted by La.
For a given conjecture v 2 (Sb), let a supp v sa denote that the mixed strategy
a 2 (Sa) satises a(a;sb) = a(sa;sb) for every sb 2 supp v. That is, a supp v sa
means that a is outcome equivalent to sa in supp v.
Denition 2. A strategy sa 2 Sa is event-rational if there exists a conjecture v 2 (Sb) and
a list ` 2 Lb such that:
 sa 2 BRa(v),
 for each F 2 ` with F n supp v 6= ; and mixed strategy a 2 (Sa) with a supp v sa,
there exists a conjecture v0 2 (Sb) with supp v0 = F n supp v such that a(sa;v0) 
a(a;v0),
 Sb 2 `.
Likewise for b.
The idea is that Ann uses each of the sets in the list ` to break ties: whenever she has
a conjecture v 2 (Sb) over Bob's choices under which sa is optimal and sa is outcome-
equivalent to a (mixed) strategy a in supp v, Ann uses each F 2 ` as the \tie-breaking
10experiments": there has to exist a probability measure v0 with support on F n supp v that
validates the choice of sa. Ann is fully condent in her conjecture v and in her best response
sa to v as long as there is no a that is outcome equivalent to sa in supp v. In that case,
her probabilistic assessments captured by v are irrelevant, for whichever other conjecture ^ v
with supp ^ v = supp v would not help Ann breaking ties between sa and a. In that case,
Ann uses the tie breaking list `.
It is important to note that, although the \tie-breaking experiments" are additional
thought experiments that Ann uses to guide her choices, they do not play the role of addi-
tional hypotheses in a lexicographic framework. If sa is indierent to a according to v, but
not outcome equivalent in supp v, then there is no need to break ties. The following Lemma
shows the connection between admissibility and event-rationality.
Lemma 2. For each F 2 `, if sa is event-rational under ` and v such that supp v  F,
then sa is admissible with respect to Sa  F. Conversely, if sa is admissible with respect to
Sa  F, for each F 2 ` and Sb 2 `, then sa is event-rational under `.
Proof. Suppose that sa is event-rational for v such that supp v  F. If supp v = F then
the result is immediate so suppose supp v  F and F n supp v 6= ;. Suppose there exists
a 2 (Sa) with (a;sb)  a(sa;sb) for every sb 2 F, with strict inequality for some
sb 2 F. Because sa 2 BRa(v), we have sa supp v a, which implies that there exists v0 with
supp v0 = F n supp v and (sa;v0)  (a;v0), a contradiction. Conversely, because sa is
admissible with respect to Sa  Sb, there exists v with supp v = Sb such that sa 2 BR(v).
Moreover, for each F 2 ` we have F n supp v = ;.
Turn now to decision theoretic considerations. We postulate that a decision maker (Ann)
may contemplate several theories. She has a theory captured by her preference relation %
and the resulting probability measure . Let F0 = supp  and write % as %0. Moreover,
when faced with a comparison between two acts that are completely indierent according
to her theory, Ann resorts to alternate theories, or gedankenexperiments (thought experi-
ments). This is captured by a list of conditional preferences, where the conditioning event
is outside F0. Formally, Ann's theories are captured by a list of preferences (%0;%1;:::;%k)
and the resulting supports (F0;:::;Fk). F0 represents the theory that guides her choices,
while (F1;:::;Fk) are thought experiments, used only for the purposes of breaking complete
indierence. Put dierently, F0 describes Ann's frame of mind, as it contains the states
11that Ann considers possible, and (F1;:::;Fk) describe zero probability \counter-factuals" as
F0 \ Fi = ; for each i = 1;:::;k. Ann prefers an act x to an act y if x %0 y and if x is
outcome-equivalent to y in F0, then x %i y for all i = 1;:::;k. Appendix A provides a more
detailed exposition and shows that the notion just dened is equivalent to event-rationality.
3.1.1 Gedankenexperiments
It is important to stress that each Fi, i > 0, is considered impossible by Ann, as it is
the support of a preference conditional on an event which is disjoint from her support, F0.
Resorting to an alternative theory to break ties does not entail considering the alternative
theory possible. This is obviously true when dealing with \facts": for instance, one may
wonder what would have happened if Germany had won World War II, and use it to help
deciding whether to move to Germany or not. But one knows that Germany did not win.
So the counter-factual \what if Germany had won" is simply a mental construct, and the
decision maker is sure that it is impossible. With beliefs, the distinction is not so sharp,
because there is no presumption that a conjecture will necessarily come to pass. Still, a
decision maker that is fully condent in her conjecture may contemplate alternative scenarios,
as a way to validate her planned choices, without considering the alternative scenarios real
possibilities. As an extreme example, consider the same decision to move or not to Germany,
and say that under the scenario considered by the decision maker, she is completely indierent
between the two options. Now consider the alternative scenario of Martians invading the
Earth. And consider that the decision maker is fully condent that this is impossible. Still,
say that in her mind living in Germany would be the best way to be protected from Martians.
This alone may tip the scale in favor of moving to Germany.
To repeat, our postulate is that resorting to thought experiments does not entail consid-
ering the events used in the thought experiment possible. The following example, suggested
by an anonymous referee, illustrates this point further.
L C R
U 4;6 0;0 4;3
M 0;0 4;6 0;3
D 2;3 2;3 0;0
Suppose that Ann is represented by a measure with support F0 = fL,Cg and she resorts
12to the gedankenexperiment F1 = fRg to resolve complete indierence. Ann's subjective belief
assigns 50% probability to L and C respectively. Conditional on F1, Ann's subjective belief
assigns 100% probability to R. D is outcome equivalent to a coin-ip between U and M under
%0, so Ann cannot decide between D and this coin-ip, and resorts to F1 for help. Under %1,
D is strongly dominated by the coin ip, so the coin ip is preferred to D (equivalently, Ann's
tie-breaking list consists of the set R, and there's no conjecture supported in R that makes
D better than the coin ip, so D is not event-rational). Note that R is weakly dominated
by a coin ip between L and C. So Ann resorts to a thought experiment whereby Bob plays
an inadmissible strategy. But, as we indicated above, this does not mean that Ann does not
believe that Bob plays admissible: her theory only considers possible Bob playing either L
or C, which are admissible. So Ann believes that Bob plays admissible, and at the same
time Ann uses an alternative theory to help break ties.
Moreover, the alternative theories are not restricted to be measurable with respect to
Bob's rationality (or lack of it). The same referee suggested the following modication of
the example:
L C R E
U 4;6 0;0 4;3 4;6
M 0;0 4;6 0;3 0;0
D 2;3 2;3 0;0 0;3
Imagine again that Ann is represented by two preferences, with F0 = fL,Cg and F1 =
fR,Eg (the second being the gedankenexperiment used to break ties). Conditional on F1
Ann's subjective belief assigns 50% probability to R and E respectively, and %0 is as above.
Ann again decides for the coin ip between U and M over D by resorting to %1, which is a
thought experiment that envisages Bob playing an admissible strategy E and an inadmissible
strategy R. Yet again, Ann knows that Bob plays admissible (either L or C).
What is at stake here is our perspective over thought experiments. Instead of having
\innitely less likely events" represent what Ann believes is impossible and yet possible, we
x that Ann only considers F0 possible. The gedankenexperiments are the events fF1;:::;Fkg,
which Ann believes are impossible. Yet, Ann uses the information coming from these thought
experiments to help break ties.
Note that because Ann is not indierent between two strategies that are outcome equiv-
13alent under her support, she \considers everything to be possible" in terms of how she acts.
However, when reasoning about Bob, she uses her measure  (and possibly an additional
tie-breaking set to validate her beliefs) and therefore believes that Bob is event-rational.
The combination of considering everything possible and believing that Bob is event-rational
resolves the inclusion/exclusion tension. In the two examples above, Ann's theory only con-
siders Bob playing admissible strategies, so Ann includes only admissible strategies. At the
same time, event-rational Ann breaks ties with thought experiments that envisage Bob play-
ing either admissible or inadmissible strategies, so Ann does not have to include all of Bob's
strategies in her frame of mind.
3.2 Type Structures and Beliefs
Type structures are used to describe interactive beliefs. Because event-rationality has players
using tie-breaking sets, a type of a player must determine a conjecture and a list of tie-
breaking sets. Fix a two-player nite strategic-form game hSa;Sb;a;bi.










where a : T a ! (Sb  T b)  Lb, and similarly for b. Members of T a, T b are called types,
members of La, Lb are called lists and members of Sa  T a  Sb  T b are called states.
We refer to an (Sa;Sb)-based type structure with tie-breaking lists as simply a type
structure. The types spaces T a and T b are assumed topological. The sets Sa, Sb, La, Lb are
nite, and we endow each with the discrete topology so that they are compact spaces. The
belief mappings a and b are assumed Borel measurable. A type structure is: complete
when a and b are surjective (c.f. Brandenburger (2003)); continuous when a and b are
continuous; and compact when T a and T b are compact spaces.
The by now standard construction of all coherent hierarchies of \beliefs about beliefs"
yields a complete, continuous and compact type structure. So existence of such structures
(which we assume in some of our results below) is guaranteed. Some details are provided in
Appendix B.
We use the notation a(ta) = (a(ta);`a(ta)), with a(ta) 2 (Sb  T b) and `a(ta) 2 Lb.
Similarly for b.







as the set of types that are certain of the event E. This is the standard denition of certainty
(as 1-belief): the states of Bob are the strategy type pairs in Sb  T b, and Ann's beliefs are
over Bob's states. Note that Ba satises monotonicity: if Ann is certain of E and E  F
then Ann is also certain of F.





a : projSbE 2 `
a(t
a)g:
We say that a type of Ann's has a validated belief in an event E  Sb T b if the type







Appendix A provides a preference based characterization of validated beliefs.
3.2.1 Lists made of Subsets of Strategies Suce for Breaking Ties
Before moving on, let us stress the following important property. The principle behind event-
rationality is that a player goes beyond her \frame of mind" to break ties. With a formal
type structure, the frame of mind is given by a type ta and its associated assessment a(ta)
over Sb T b (note that the list `a(ta) captures what's is beyond the frame of mind). So one
could argue that we should consider lists over subsets of Sb T b, thereby treating strategies
and types symmetrically. In fact, the inclusion/exclusion tension identied by Samuelson
(1992) could be interpreted as requiring that the player includes \everything else" in her
thought experiments.6
But it is redundant to include lists of subsets of Sb T b for tie-breaking purposes: a list
` made of subsets Eb of Sb breaks ties between sa and a if, and only if, a list ^ ` made of
subsets E of Sb  T b whose projections on Sb are given by the subsets Eb of the list ` also
breaks ties between sa and a. This is obvious: types are payo irrelevant.
6This logic is employed in BFK.
15Moreover, if one insists in using lists ^ ` of subsets of Sb  T b, the analysis below would





a : E 2 ^ `
a(t
a)g
in the place of the operator Ba
, where ^ `a(ta) would denote the list of subsets of Sb  T b
associated with type ta. In fact, as we just argued, tie-breaking purposes would not restrict
the \type" component of the lists ^ `. In Appendix B we show that nothing relevant would be
changed in the analysis below. Thus, the seemingly asymmetric treatment of strategies and
types is irrelevant, as a symmetric analysis can be provided with the appropriate changes in
notation.
3.3 RCBER - Rationality and Common Belief of Event-Rationality
With type structures, a state for Ann is a pair (sa;ta) determining what she plays (sa) and
her state of mind (ta). We extend the denition of event-rationality to strategy-type pairs
as follows:
Denition 4. Strategy-type pair (sa;ta) 2 Sa  T a is event-rational if
 sa 2 BRa(v), for v = margSba(ta),
 for each F 2 `a(ta) with F nsupp v 6= ; and mixed strategy a 2 (Sa) with a supp v
sa, there exists a conjecture v0 2 (Sb) with supp v0 = F nsupp v such that a(sa;v0) 
a(a;v0),
 Sb 2 `a(ta).
Likewise for b.
Let Ra













Denition 5. If (sa;ta;sb;tb) 2 Ra
m+1  Rb
m+1, say there is event-rationality and mth-order







say there is event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER) at this state.
16In words, there is RCBER at a state if Ann is event-rational, Ann believes that Bob
is event-rational, Ann believes that Bob believes that Ann is event-rational, and so on.
Similarly for Bob. Believing that Bob is event-rational means that Ann is certain that
Bob only chooses strategies that are best responses to Bob's conjectures that Ann considers
possible, and that Bob breaks ties using the sets of strategies in his list.
Note that for a strategy-type pair (sa;ta) to belong to Ra
m the following conditions are
satised. Strategy sa is a best response to v = margSba(ta), a(ta)(Rb
m 1) = 1 and whenever
a supp v sa, for each Eb 2 `a(ta), there exists a conjecture v0 in Eb n supp v for which
a(sa;v0)  a(a;v0). Notice that Ann is certain that the conjectures of Bob are of the
form v = margSab(tb), for tb 2 projTbRb
m 1, and knows that, for each such conjecture, Bob
breaks each tie using some v0 in Eb n supp v. We show below that this exibility implies
that the set of strategies compatible with RCBER are the ones that survive one round of
elimination of inadmissible strategies, followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated
strategies.



















The only dierence with RCBER is that we use the validated belief operator instead of
the standard one.




m+1, say there is event-rationality and mth-order








m say there is event-rationality and common consistent belief of event-rationality
(RCvBER) at this state.
Because validated beliefs are stronger than standard beliefs, RCvBER  RCBER.
Note again that RCBER and RCvBER avoid the inclusion-exclusion tension. What a
type ta of Ann believes about Bob's choices is given by the marginal of a(ta) over Sb.
And a type that knows that Bob's strategy-type pairs are in R
b
m is a type that assigns
17positive probability only to the strategies that are consistent with R
b
m. So many of Bob's
strategies can be excluded from ta's consideration, without causing any contradiction in
the construction. The event-rational (sa;ta) resorts to the tie-breaking list `a(ta) to handle
counter-factuals, without having to believe that the counter-factuals are a real possibility.
4 Solution Concepts
4.1 Self-Admissible and Hypo-Admissible Sets
By construction, event-rationality implies playing admissible strategies. If we add common
belief of event-rationality, then the solution concept is that of a hypo-admissible set (HAS)
that we dene below. We compare the HAS with several solution concepts that have been
proposed in the literature. But rst a denition.
Denition 7. Say that ra supports sa given Qb if there exists some a 2 (Sa) with ra 2
supp a and a(a;sb) = a(sa;sb) for all sb 2 Qb. Write suQb(sa) for the set of ra 2 Sa
that supports sa given Qb. Likewise for b.
This is a generalization of the denition in BFK of the support of a strategy sa, which
they denote su(sa). In particular, suSb(sa) = su(sa).
BFK characterize rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) by the
solution concept of a self-admissible set (SAS).
Denition 8. The set Qa  Qb  Sa  Sb is an SAS if:
 each sa 2 Qa is admissible with respect to Sa  Sb,
 each sa 2 Qa is admissible with respect to Sa  Qb,
 for any sa 2 Qa, if ra 2 suSb(sa), then ra 2 Qa.
Likewise for b.
In particular, BFK show that the projection of the RCAR into Sa  Sb is an SAS.
Conversely, given an SAS Qa  Qb, there is a type structure such that the projection of
RCAR into Sa  Sb is equal to Qa  Qb. BFK discuss the need for the third requirement in
the denition of an SAS. In particular, consider the weak best response sets (WBRS), which
does not include a restriction on convex combinations.
18Denition 9. The set Qa  Qb  Sa  Sb is a WBRS if:
 each sa 2 Qa is admissible with respect to Sa  Sb,
 each sa 2 Qa is not strongly dominated with respect to Sa  Qb.
Likewise for b.
As Brandenburger (1992) and B orgers (1994) show, if common assumption of rationality
is relaxed to common belief at level 0 of rationality (RCB0R) (that is, believing E means
0(E) = 1, where 0 is the rst measure of the agent's LPS), then the projection of RCB0R
into Sa Sb is a WBRS. Conversely, given a WBRS Qa Qb, there is a type structure such
that Qa  Qb is contained in (but not necessarily equal to) the projection of RCB0R into
Sa  Sb.7
We are now ready to introduce the solution concept of hypo-admissible sets (HAS).
Denition 10. The set Qa  Qb  Sa  Sb is an HAS if:
 each sa 2 Qa is admissible with respect to Sa  Sb.
For each sa 2 Qa there is nonempty Q0  Qb such that
 sa is admissible with respect to Sa  Q0,
 for any sa 2 Qa, if ra 2 suQ0(sa) and ra is admissible with respect to Sa  Sb then
ra 2 Qa.
Likewise for b.
Note that the rst two properties for a WBRS are equivalent to the rst two properties
for an HAS and they are implied by the rst two properties for an SAS. Hence, the SAS
and the HAS are always WBRS but the opposite does not hold. Moreover, an SAS is not
necessarily an HAS and an HAS is not necessarily an SAS. The dierences between the HAS
and the SAS can be further illustrated by the following two solution concepts. The rst
is S1W, the set of strategies that survive one round of deletion of inadmissible strategies
followed by iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies (Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)).
7See Section 11 in BFK.
19Denition 11. Let SW i
1 = Si
1, for i = a;b be the set admissible strategies and dene



















The second is the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated
strategies, the IA set.
Denition 12. Set Si












A strategy si 2 Si
m is called m-admissible. A strategy si 2
T1
m=0 Si
m is called iteratively
admissible (IA).
We then have that the S1W set is both an HAS and a WBRS (but not an SAS) and
the IA set is an SAS and a WBRS (but not a HAS). The following game from Section 2





The IA set is fMgfRg. It is an SAS but not an HAS, because although L 2 sufMg(R)
and L is admissible, it does not belong to the IA set. Moreover, S1W = fU;Mg  fL;Rg
is an HAS but not an SAS, because L is not admissible with respect to fU;Mg. That is, in
a sense the SAS captures IA whereas the HAS captures S1W.
4.2 Generalized Self-Admissible and Hypo-Iteratively Admissible
Sets
In Section 5 we show that HAS characterizes RCBER with E = S. With a view to obtain a
characterization of RCvBER and to relate it to the concepts presented above, we introduce
the following two solution concepts.
20Denition 13. The set Qa  Qb  Sa  Sb is an SASPaPb if:
 each sa 2 Qa is admissible with respect to Sa  Sb,
 each sa 2 Qa is admissible with respect to Sa  Qb,
 for any sa 2 Qa, if ra 2 suPb(sa) and ra is admissible with respect to Sa  Sb, then
ra 2 Qa.
Likewise for b.
This is a generalization of the SAS, since the only dierence is that the support suPb(sa)
is with respect to an abstract set P b, not Sb. This means that the SAS is equivalent to the
SASSaSb.8 Moreover, if Qa  Qb  P a  P b then an SASQaQb is also an SASPaPb, but
the reverse may not hold. This means that for any P a  P b, an SASPaPb is also an SAS.
Moreover, an SASQaQb Qa  Qb is also an HAS.
Denition 14. A set Qa  Qb is a hypo-iteratively admissible (HIA) set if there exist se-




i=0, with W a
0 = Sa, W b
0 = Sb, such that for each m  0,
 each sa 2 W a
m+1 is admissible with respect to Sa  W b
m and belongs to W a
m,
 for any k, m, where k  m, if sa 2 W a
k+1, ra 2 suWb
k(sa) \ W a
m and ra is admissible
with respect to Sa  W b
m, then ra 2 W a
m+1,
 there is k such that for all m  k, W a
m = Qa.
Likewise for b.
The HIA sets resemble the IA set, with the only dierence that one starts with a subset
of admissible strategies and always includes the strategies that are equivalent (in the sense
of suQ) to strategies that survive subsequent rounds. Moreover, the HIA can be thought
of as an analogue of the best response set (BRS).9 If we replace admissible with strongly
undominated in the denition of HIA then we get a BRS. Conversely, each BRS Qa  Qb
can be written as a modied HIA (just set W a
i = Qa and W b
i = Qb for all i  1).
8Note that if ra 2 suSb(sa) and sa is admissible, then ra is also admissible. Hence, the third condition
for a SASSaSb is identical to the third condition for a SAS.
9Recall that Qa  Qb is a BRS if each sa 2 Qa is strongly undominated with respect to Sa  Qb and
likewise for b.
215 Characterization of RCBER
Propositions 1 and 2 below show that RCBER is characterized by the HAS set in a rich
type structure, and that RCmBER generates the SW a
m  SW b
m strategies, for each m, in a
complete type structure.
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m is an HAS.
(ii) Fix an HAS Qa Qb. Then there is a rich type structure hSa;Sb;La;Lb;T a;T b;a;bi







Proof. Throughout we keep the convention that for any two sets, E and F, E  F = ;







is empty, then the conditions for HAS are satised, so suppose that it is nonempty and x
sa 2 Qa = projSa
T1
m=1 Ra
m. Then, for some ta, (sa;ta) is consistent with RCBER and sa
is admissible, by Lemma 2. Since ta believes each Rb




From the conjuction and marginalization properties of belief there is v = margSba(ta), with
support contained in projSb
T1
m=1 Rb
m, such that sa is optimal under v.
Let Q0 = supp v. We have that sa is admissible with respect to Q0 = supp v, which is
a subset of Qb = projSb
T1
m=1 Rb
m. Suppose sa 2 Qa, ra 2 susupp v(sa) and ra is admissible.
From Lemma D.2 in BFK, ra is optimal under v whenever (sa;ta) 2 Ra
1.10 Because the
type structure is rich, there exists type ta
0 with a(ta
0) = a(ta) and `a(ta
0) = Sb. Since ra is
admissible, we have that (ra;ta
0) 2 Ra
1. The same is true for all Ra
m, hence the third property
for an HAS is satised.
For part (ii) x an HAS Qa  Qb and note that for each sa 2 Qa which is admissible
with respect to Qsa  Qb, there is a v with supp v = Qsa under which sa is optimal.
We can choose v such that ra is optimal under v if and only if ra 2 suQsa(sa) (Lemma
D.4 in BFK).11 Dene type spaces T a = Qa, T b = Qb, with a and b chosen so that
10Lemma D.2 species that if F is a face of a polytope P and x 2 F, then su(x)  F, where su(x) is the
set of points that support x. The geometry of polytopes is presented in Appendix D in BFK.
11Lemma D.4 species that if x belongs to a strictly positive face of a polytope P, then su(x) is a strictly
positive face of P.
22supp a(sa) = f(sb;sb) : sb 2 Qsag, `a(sa) = fSbg and v = margSba(sa) for the v found
above. Similarly for b. Note that the type structure is rich.
First, we show that for each sa 2 Qa, (sa;sa) is event-rational. By construction, sa
is optimal under v = margSba(sa) and admissible. Hence, (sa;sa) is event-rational and
Qa  projSaRa
1. Suppose (ra;ta) 2 Ra
1, where ta = sa. Then, ra 2 suQsa(sa) and ra is
admissible with respect to Qsa. From Lemma 2, ra is admissible. From the denition of an
HAS this implies that ra 2 Qa and Qa = projSaRa
1. Applying similar arguments we have
that Qb = projSbRb
1.
By construction, each ta 2 Qa puts positive probability only to elements in the diagonal
(sb;sb) which consists of event-rational strategy-type pairs, hence ta believes Rb
1 and (sa;sa) 2
Ra
2. This implies that Ra
2 = Ra




1 for all m, by
induction. Since projSaRa
1 projSbRb


















Proof. Let T a
0 be the set of types ta such that `a(ta) = fSbg. From Lemma 2 we have that
(sa;ta) 2 Ra
1 implies sa is admissible. Conversely, since we have a complete structure, if sa is
admissible then there exists ta 2 T a
0 such that (sa;ta) 2 Ra
1. Hence, projSaRa
1 = Sa




1 = SW b
1. Suppose that for up to m we have that projSaRa
m = SW a
m and
projSbRb
m = SW b
m. Suppose sa 2 SW a
m+1. Then, sa 2 SW a
m = projSaRa
m. Because sa is
not strongly dominated with respect to SW a
m SW b
m, it is also not strongly dominated with
respect to Sa  SW b
m. Hence, there is a v with supp v  SW b
m under which sa is optimal.
We take (sa;ta), ta 2 T a
0, with supp a(ta)  Rb
m and margSba(ta) = v. Because sa is




1  k  m, we have that (sa;ta) 2 Ra
m+1 and sa 2 projSaRa
m+1.
Suppose sa 2 projSaRa
m+1. Then, sa 2 SW a
m = projSaRa
m and supp margSba(ta) 
SW b
m = projSbRb
m. Because sa is optimal under v, where supp v  SW b
m, sa is not strongly
dominated with respect to SW b
m and therefore sa 2 SW a
m+1.
236 Characterization of RCvBER
Propositions 3 and 4 below show that RCvBER is characterized by the HIA set and RmvBER
generates the IA set in a complete type structure, for big enough m.



















is an HIA set.
(ii) Fix an HIA set QaQb. Then there is a rich type structure hSa;Sb;La;Lb;T a;T b;a;bi

















m is empty, then the




m for m  1 and likewise for b. From Lemma 2, all strategies
in projSbR
a
m+1 are admissible with respect to Sa  W b









k(sa) \ W a
m and ra is admissible with respect to Sa  W b
m. This implies that for
some ta, (sa;ta) 2 R
a
k+1, where supp margSba(ta)  W b
k and list `a(ta) contains at least all
sets W b
p, for p  m. Because the type structure is rich, there exists type ta
0, with `a(ta
0) that
contains all sets W b
p, for p  m, and nothing else. Moreover, ta
0 is identical to ta in all other
respects. Since ra 2 suWb
k(sa), ra is optimal given margSba(ta
0). Moreover, ra is admissible
with respect to Sa  W b
p, for p  m.
All these imply that (ra;ta
0) 2 R
a









m is nonempty and the strategies are nite.
For part (ii), x an HIA set QaQb, with sequences of sets fW a
mgm=n0




n0 = Qa and W b
n = Qb. Construct the following type structure. For each m  1, for each
sa 2 W a
m, nd the measure v(sa;m) with support on W b
m 1 such that ra is a best response
to v(sa;m) if and only if ra 2 suWb
m 1(sa). This is possible because of Lemma D.4 in BFK.




m j if it is equal to W b
m j 1) and assigns positive probability only to strategy-
types (sb;tb(sb;m   1)), for sb 2 W b
m 1. Finally, assign to each sa 2 Sa type ta(ra;0) which
is equal to ta(ra;k), for some ra 2 W a
k, k > 0. Similarly for b.




1. Suppose that sa 2 W a
1. Because sa is admissible and a best response to v(sa;1), we have
(sa;ta(sa;1)) 2 R
a
1 and sa 2 projSaR
a
1. Suppose ra 2 projSaR
a
1. Then, ra is a best response
to some measure v(sa;k + 1), k  0, for sa 2 W a
k+1 and ra 2 suWb
k(sa) \ W a
0. Because
(ra;ta(sa;k + 1)) is event-rational, ra is admissible. Therefore, by the second property for
an HIA set, ra 2 W a
1. Moreover, by construction, for each sa 2 W a




Assume that for up to m, projSaR
a
m = W a




m. Similarly for b. Suppose that sa 2 W a
m+1. By construction, sa is a best response to
v(sa;m + 1), which has a support of W b
m = projSbR
b
m, and it is admissible with respect
to Sa  W b
m. Moreover, `a(ta(sa;m + 1)) = fW b
0;:::;W b
mg and type ta(sa;m + 1) assigns
positive probability only to types (sb;tb(sb;m)) 2 R
b
m, for sb 2 W b
m. This implies that
(sa;ta(sa;m+1)) 2 R
a
m+1 and sa 2 projSaR
a
m+1. Suppose ra 2 projSaR
a
m+1. By construction,
the only measures that have support which is a subset of W b
m are measures that are associated
with strategies sa that belong to W a
k+1, where k + 1 > m. Hence, (ra;ta(sa;k + 1)) 2 R
a
m+1
and ra is a best response to some measure v(sa;k + 1). By construction, ra 2 suWb
k(sa).
Moreover, ra is admissible with respect to Sa  W b
m. Hence, by the second property for an
HIA set we have that ra 2 W a
m+1.


























m. Because sa is admissible with respect to Sa
mSb
m, it is also admissible
with respect to SaSb
m. Note that Sb
m  :::Sb
1  Sb and take ta such that margSba(ta) = v,
`a(ta) = fSb;Sb
1;:::;Sb
mg. Because sa is admissible with respect to SaSb
m, we can choose v
such that suppv = Sb




i 2 `(ta) with Sb
i n Sb
m 6= ; and mixed strategy a such that a Sb
m sa. Suppose there
exists no measure v0, with suppv0 = Sb
i n suppv, such that a(sa;v0)  a(a;v0). Then, a
weakly dominates sa on Sb
i, which implies that sa is not admissible with respect to Sa Sb
i,
a contradiction. Therefore, (sa;ta) is event-rational and ta 2 Ba
v(R
b
k) for all k  m, which
25implies that (sa;ta) 2 R
a
m+1 and sa 2 projSaR
a
m+1.
Suppose sa 2 projSaR
a
m+1. Then, sa 2 Sa
m = projSaR
a
m and there exists ta such that
(sa;ta) 2 R
a
m+1 and supp margSba(ta)  Sb
m = projSbR
b





`a(ta). Hence, we have that sa is admissible with respect to Sa
m  Sb
m and sa 2 Sa
m+1.
6.1 Comparison with BFK
BFK's LPS-based approach uses the following construction. Let L+(X) be the space of fully
supported LPS's over X, that is, the space of nite sequences  = (0;:::;n 1), for some
integer n, where i 2 (X) and
Sn 1
i=0 supp i = X. In addition, the measures i in  are
required to be non-overlapping, that is, mutually singular. A lexicographic type structure is
a type structure where a : T a ! L+(Sb T b), and similarly for b. An event E is assumed
by type ta of Ann if and only if there is a level j such that a(ta) assigns probability one to
the event E for all levels k  j, and assigns probability zero to the event for all levels k > j.
Yang (2009) uses a weaker notion that allows the levels higher than j to assign positive
(and strictly smaller than 1) weights to the event. The use of lexicographic beliefs is to be
contrasted with our use of standard beliefs.
RCAR in BFK is characterized by the SAS and RmAR (m levels of mutual assumption)
produces the IA set in a complete structure, for big enough m. Since RmcBER generates the
IA set as well, it is important to know what is the relationship between RCAR and RCvBER
in terms of the solution concepts they generate. The following Proposition and examples
show that RCvBER generates a strict subclass of SAS, hence it is a more restrictive notion
than RCAR. However, as we show in the following section, RCvBER and RCBER are always
nonempty in a complete, continuous and compact structure, unlike RCAR. Let Aa and Ab
be the set of Ann's and Bob's admissible strategies, respectively.
Proposition 5.










(ii) Fix an SASQaQb QaQb. Then there is a type structure hSa;Sb;La;Lb;T a;T b;a;bi

















m is empty, then the
conditions for SASAaAb are satised, so suppose that it is nonempty. By denition of event-




m is admissible with respect to
Sa  Sb and Sa  Qb.





m implies that supp margSba(ta)  Ab and ra is optimal under v =
margSba(ta) (Lemma D.2 in BFK). Because ra is admissible we have that (ra;ta) 2 R
a
1.
For each m  2, (sa;ta) 2 R
a
m implies that ta has a validated belief in Rb
m 1. Because
projSbRb
m 1  Ab and ra 2 suAb(sa), we have that (ra;ta) 2 R
a
m and ra 2 Qa.
For part (ii) x an SASQaQb QaQb and note that for each sa 2 Qa which is admissible
with respect to Qb, there is a v with supp v = Qb under which sa is optimal. We can choose v
such that ra is optimal under v if and only if ra 2 suQb(sa) (Lemma D.4 in BFK). Dene type
spaces T a = Qa, T b = Qb, with a and b chosen so that supp a(sa) = f(sb;sb) : sb 2 Qbg
and supp b(sb) = f(sa;sa) : sa 2 Qag; and `a(sa) = fSbg and `b(sb) = fSag for all sa and
sb.
By construction and applying similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1, we
have that Qa = projSaR
a
1 and Qb = projSbR
b
1. Moreover, each type ta 2 Qa puts positive
probability only to elements in the diagonal (sb;sb), which consists of event-rational strategy-
type pairs, hence ta has a validated belief inR
b
1. Since all types only consider the list fSbg






















In words, for a given type structure, the strategies compatible with RCvBER form a sub-
class of all of the SAS, and there is a class of SAS (the QaQb sets that are SASQaQb) whose
strategies are compatible with RCvBER for some type structure. Because an SASQaQb
Qa  Qb is an SASAaAb but the converse is not true, Proposition 5 does not provide a
characterization of RCvBER. It does show, however, that RCAR, which is characterized by
SAS (BFK, Proposition 8.1), is less restrictive than RCvBER.
In fact, the following game provides an example of an SAS that is not an SASAaAb and
cannot be generated by RCvBER for any type structure. Hence, RCvBER generates a strict
subclass of SAS.
27L C R
U 1;1 2;1 1;1
M 2;2 0;1 1;0
D 0;1 4;2 0;0
Note that all strategies except for R are admissible and that fUg  fL;Cg is an SAS
but not an SASAaAb. The reason is that D and M are in the support of a mixed strategy
(assigning weight 1/2 to each) that is equivalent to U given that Bob plays his admissible
strategies L and C, but not given the set of all strategies Sb. Since D and M are not included
in fUg  fL;Cg, this is not an SASAaAb.
We now argue that fUgfL;Cg cannot be the outcome of RCvBER. First, note that if
this were the case, the types of Ann included in RCvBER should assign zero probability to
Bob playing R. Note also that U is a best response only when Pr(L) = 2
3 and Pr(C) = 1
3
and, for these conjectures, also M and D are best responses. Is it possible that M and D
are excluded because types playing these strategies are not fL;Cg-rational or Sb-rational?
No, because M and D are admissible with respect to both fL;Cg and Sb. Hence, under
RCvBER, for any type structure, whenever U is included, M and D are included as well.
In the following game all strategies are admissible, hence an SAS is equivalent to an
SASAaAb.
L C R
U 1;1 2;1 1;1
M 2;2 0;1 1;5
D 0;1 4;2 0;0
The same arguments show that RCvBER cannot produce fUgfL;Cg which is both an
SAS and an SASAaAb but not an SASQaQb. Hence, we cannot have a tighter characteriza-
tion in terms of Proposition 5.
As a last comparison note that, from the proof of Proposition 4, a type of Ann that is
event-rational and has (m + 1)-th order validated belief of event-rationality in a complete
type structure, necessarily has the sets Sb
0, Sb
1, ..., Sb
m in the type's tie-breaking list. This
gives the intuition behind how RCvBER generates the IA set. In comparison, in BFK a
28type ta of Ann that is rational and satises (m + 1)-th order assumption of rationality in a




supp i = S
b
k
where (0;:::;n 1) is the list of marginals over Sb associated with type ta.
7 Possibility Results for RCBER and RCvBER
Since the games are assumed to be nite, Propositions 2 and 4 suggest that RmBER and
RmvBER generate the S1W and IA sets, respectively, for m large enough. However, an
epistemic criterion for S1W and IA has to be the same across all games and therefore
independent of m. Below we show that RCBER and RCvBER are nonempty whenever
the type structure is complete, continuous and compact (and recall that the universal type
structure (Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Appendix B) satises these properties), hence
providing an epistemic criterion for S1W and IA.
Proposition 6. Fix a complete, continuous and compact type structure hSa;Sb;La;Lb;T a;T b;a;bi.
Then RCBER and RCvBER are nonempty.







non-empty for each m  1.
We rst show that Ra










n) ! (sa;ta), then va
n !
va = margSba(ta), implying that sa 2 BR(va). Also, because Sa is nite, we have sa = sa
n
for large n, so sa 2 BRa(va
n). Further, because Sb is nite, we can choose a subsequence
with supp va
n = supp va
k for all indices n;k and a fortiori supp va  supp va
n. Let a satisfy
a supp va sa. If supp va = supp va
n we have a supp va
n sa. Hence, for each Fi 2 `a(ta),
there exists vi with support equal to Fi n supp va, such that a(sa;vi)  a(a;vi). If
supp va 6= supp va
n, then because sa 2 BRa(va
n) and a supp va sa , it must be that there
exists  2 (Sb) with a(sa;)  a(a;) and supp  = supp va
n n supp va ( can be taken
as the conditional of va
n on supp va
nnsupp va). Now put 0 = +(1 )vi for some  2 (0;1),
note that supp 0 = Fi nsupp va and that a(sa;0)  a(a;0). That is, (sa;ta) 2 Ra
1, so it




1)], and pick a convergent sequence (sa
n;ta
n) therein, with
limit (sa;ta). Because Rb






1) = 1 because a(ta
n)(Rb
1) = 1 for every n. Also, event-rationality
follows from an argument similar to the argument above, and we conclude that Ra
2 is compact.
Inductively, Ra
m is compact for all m. It follows that
T
m1 Ra
m 6= ; because the family
fRa
mgm1 has the nite intersection property: for any nite list fm1;:::;mKg of positive
numbers, let mk be the largest. Then we know that Ra




We also have compactness of the sets R
a





(sa;ta), and without loss of generality focus on a subsequence with `a(ta
n) = `a(ta
k) for all
n;k. It must then be that `a(ta
n) = `a(ta). Repeat the argument in the rst paragraph of the
proof to conclude that (sa;ta) is event-rational because (sa
n;ta
n) is event-rational for each n,
and projSbR
b
m 1 2 `a(ta), so (sa;ta) 2 R
a
m. Hence we have a nested sequence of non-empty




The same arguments apply to b.
8 Conclusion
Let us summarize the contributions of the paper. (1) We dene a new notion of rationality,
named event-rationality, and provide preference basis for it. The preferences of event-rational
players are represented by a pair (;`), where  is a probability measure and ` is a set of
events used for breaking ties. We require that the set of all strategies of the opponent is a
member of `, and as a result obtain that event-rational players play admissible strategies.
(2) We dene and provide decision theoretic foundations for a new notion of \believing",
named validated belief, which relates to the preference representation of event-rationality.
(3) We provide epistemic conditions for two well-known solution concepts in game theory,
S1W and IA. We do so by constructing the set of states where \rationality and common
belief of rationality" obtain, using event-rationality as the notion of rationality, and (for
the IA case) validated belief as the notion of belief. The epistemic characterization of IA
solves a well-known and much-studied problem in a novel way. And, importantly, it does not
require the use of incomplete or discontinuous type structures. (4) We develop new solution
concepts, HAS and HIA, that are induced by RCBER and RCvBER, respectively, for any
type structure, not necessarily complete. (5) Finally, we show that RCvBER can be used to
30justify a strictly smaller class of solutions than BFK's RCAR, thus showing that RCvBER
and RCAR are not merely isomorphic conditions written in two dierent languages.
A Preference Basis
We develop below preference foundations for event rationality and validated beliefs, using
the idea that a decision maker is represented by a list of preferences. Alternative foundations
can be provided. Indeed, in an ealier version of this paper we provided foundations based
on Manzini and Mariotti (2007).
Let 
 be a state space and A the set of all measurable functions from 
 to [0;1]. For
simplicity, assume that 
 is nite (modulo technical details, the considerations below carry
through in a more general state space). A decision maker has preferences over elements of
A. We assume that the outcome space [0;1] is in utils. That is, all preferences considered
below agree on constant acts over an outcome space, so the Bernoulli indices are uniquely
dened and omitted from the analysis that follows. For x;y 2 A, 0    1, x+(1 )y is
the act that at ! gives payo x(!)+(1 )y(!). Unless otherwise noted, we assume that a
preference relation % satises completeness, transitivity, independence and has an expected
utility representation.
Denition 15. x %E y if for some z 2 A, (xE;z
nE) % (yE;z
nE).
Note that for preferences satisfying the aforementioned axioms, (xE;z
nE) % (yE;z
nE)
holds for all z if it holds for some z. An event E is Savage null if x E y for all x;y 2 A.
For a given %, the set N(%)  
 denotes the union of all non Savage null events according
to %.
Fix a game and the resulting set of available acts B. An act x 2 B is event-rational if
there exist a preference % and a list ` = fF1;:::;Fkg, with Fi  
 for i = 1;:::;k such that
 x % y for every y 2 B,
 for each Fi 2 ` with Fi n N(%) 6= ; and act y 2 B with x(!) = y(!) for all ! 2 N(%),
there exists a preference %0 with N(%0) = Fi n N(%) such that x %0 y,
 
 2 `.
31Therefore, the denition of event-rationality is identical to that of the main text.
Consider a decision maker represented by a list of preferences f%igk
i=0 with N(%i) \
N (%0) = ? for i = 1;:::;k and N(%i) = 
 n N(%0) for some i.12 The interpretation is that
N(%0) is the theory of the decision maker, and the list fN(%i)gk
i=1 represent probability-
zero gedankenexperiments, used to break ties. Formally, given a list of preferences f%igk
i=0
satisfying the aforementioned two properties we dene an induced preference relation over
acts, %c, as follows:
Denition 16. x %c y if and only if either
 x %0 y and x 6= y on N(%0) or
 x = y on N(%0) and x %i y for i = 1;:::;k.
Note that %c is incomplete but transitive. An act x is %c-rational if x %c y for every
y 2 B.
Proposition 7. An act x is %c-rational if and only if it is event-rational.
Proof. By denition, if x is %c-rational, then it is event-rational under %=%0 and ` =
fF1;:::;Fkg, with Fi = N(%i) [ N(%0) for i = 1;:::;k.
Conversely, let x be event-rational under ^ % and ` = fF1;:::;Fkg. If x 6= y on N(^ %),
then x %c y using %0= ^ %. So let us focus on acts in C = fy 2 B : y = x on N(^ %)g: Let
m = #
nN(^ %), and note that the set C can be identied as a convex in [0;1]m, with x 2 C.
For each i = 1;:::;k where Ei = Fi n N(^ %) 6= ;, let Bi = fr 2 Rm
+ : rjEi  xjEig, where xjEi
denotes the vector x restricted to states in Ei. Note that Bi \ C = ;, because otherwise
there would exist an act y that is outcome-equivalent to x and strictly preferred to x for
any preference %0 with N(%0) = Ei, contradicting event-rationality of x. Because Bi is also
convex, by the separating hyperplane theorem there exists i 2 Rm with i  r > i  y for
all r 2 Bi and y 2 C. Take r" 2 Rm
+ with r"(!) = x(!) for ! = 2 Ei and r"(!) = x(!) + " for
! 2 Ei and " > 0. Then r" 2 Bi. Letting " ! 0, we have r" ! x and we obtain ix  iy
for every y 2 C.
Also, i can be chosen to satisfy i(!) > 0 only if ! 2 Ei. Otherwise, say that i(!0) > 0
and !0 = 2 Ei. If y(!0) = 0 for every act in B, then i(!0) can be set equal to zero without
12One can think of conditional preferences, as in Luce and Krantz (1971), Fishburn (1973) and Ghirardato
(2002).
32loss. If x(!0) = 0 and there exists y 2 C with y(!0) > 0, then it cannot be the case that
Fi = f!0g for any i = 1;:::;k. So set y(!) = x(!) for every ! 6= !0 and y(!0) > x(!0), with
y 2 C. Such a y exists because Ei 6= 
 n N(^ %) (if it was equal, then !0 would not exist)
and there is no Fi equal to f!0g. Then i  r" > i  y, for the r" constructed above. But as
" ! 0, r" ! x and ix < iy by construction. This contradicts ir" > iy for all ". In
the case that x(!0) > 0, change the r" above by having r"(!0) = 0, while keeping the other
values. Then as " ! 0, we must get i  r" < i  x, another contradiction. So the support
of i is contained in Ei.
Moreover, because for each y 2 C there exists %0 with N(%0) = Ei and x %0 y, it must be
that (!) > 0 if ! 2 Ei. If not, then there is !0 2 Ei with i(!0) = 0, and there is no other
0
i with 0
i(!0) > 0 that would separate Bi and C. Now take the original r" and y 2 C with
y(!0) > x(!0). Such a y must exist, for otherwise there would exist the required 0
i. But
there is no %0 with N(%0) = Ei and x %0 y, a contradiction. So it must be that i(!) > 0 if
and only if ! 2 Ei.
Normalizing i yields a probability distribution i with supp i = Ei for which x is
a better response than any y 2 C. Let %i be the preference relation represented by the
underlying Bernoulli index and i. The construction above is true for every i = 1;:::;k.
Setting %0= ^ % and collecting the list f%0;%1;:::;%kg it follows that x is %c-rational.
In what follows, for ease of notation, we use Ni = N(%i) for i = 0;:::;k, x iE y to
denote that x is preferred to y according to %i conditional on E (according to Denition
15), and x =0E y to denote that x(!) = y(!) for all ! 2 N0 \ E 6= ;. The notions of beliefs
we use in the main text are as follows.
Denition 17. Event E is believed under %c if N0  E.
Denition 18. Event E has a validated belief under %c and i if E = N0 [ Ni.
In words, the decision maker believes an event E if she believes it according to her theory;
and she has a validated belief in it if it is equal to the union of N0 and some Ni. Note that
it may well be that i = 0, so the decision maker may have a validated belief in the event
E = N0. Note that in the text we \validated" a belief with events that describe strategies
only. Here we do not make this distinction for ease of exposition. It is straightforward to
consider a product state space 
 = 
1  
2 and dene belief for events on 
 and validated
beliefs as those that are validated by the projection of an Ni to 
1.
33We now dene a notion of conditional %c-preference that is consistent with tie-breaking
ideas.
Denition 19. Say that x c
E y under i if
 x 0E y or
 x =0E y, x iE y and x %j y for every j 6= i.
Say that x c
E y if x c
E y for some i. Note that x c
E y under i and x =0E y necessarily
mean that i > 0.
Denition 20. An event E is nontrivial under %c and i if
 there is a pair x;y with x c
E y under i, and
 if ! 2 E is such that there is no pair x;y with x c
! y, then there is a pair x;y with
x = y on N0 such that x c
E(!) y under i, where E(!) = E \ (N0 [ f!g).
Denition 21. An event E satises strict determination under %c and i if for all x;y,
x c
E y under i implies x c y.
The following Lemma characterizes validated belief with respect to nontriviality and
strict determination.
Lemma 3. There exists i such that E has a validated belief under %c and i if and only if it
is nontrivial and satises strict determination under %c and i.
Proof. By nontriviality, E\N0 6= ?, for otherwise there would exist no pair x;y with x c
E y.
Assume by way of contradiction that there exists ^ ! 2 N0 n E. Also, let !0 2 E \ N0. Set





a if ! = ^ !




v0(^ !) , 0 < b < 1, and v0 is the conjecture associated with %0. Then,
conditional on E, the payo of x is equal to 1 whereas the payo of y is b < 1, so x c
E y;
But the unconditional payo of x is equal to v0(!0) whereas the payo of y is av0(^ !)+bv0(!0),
34so y c x, contradicting strict determination. Hence N0  E. Therefore, if for all ! 2 E
there exists a pair x;y with x c
! y, then E  N0, and we conclude that E = N0 [ Ni, with
i = 0.
If there is ! 2 E for which there is no pair x;y with x c
! y, then ! = 2 N0. By nontriviality,
there is a pair x;y with x = y on N0 with x c
E(!) y under i, meaning that x iE(!) y, which
in turn means that ! 2 Ni and i 6= 0. Hence we must have E  N0[Ni. Similarly to above,
assume by way of contradiction that there exists ^ ! 2 NinE. Also, let !0 2 E\Ni. Construct
x and y as follows: x = y on N0, and on 
 n N0 x and y are as above, with a >
vi(!0)(1 b)
vi(^ !) .
Strict determination is again violated, so we must have N0 [ Ni  E, and we conclude that
E = N0 [ Ni with i > 0.
Conversely, assume that E = N0 [ Ni for some i. Let x = 1 on N0, 0 otherwise and
y(!) = 0 for every !. Then x c
0 y and x c
E y under i. For the second condition, if i = 0,
then E = N0 and there does not exist ! 2 E such that there is no pair x;y with x c
! y.
If i 6= 0, pick ! 2 Ni (so ! = 2 N0). Set x = y on N0, x(!) = 1, y(!) = 0 and x = y = 0
elsewhere. Then x c
E(!) y, so nontriviality is satised.
Finally, let x c
E y under i. If x 0E y then x 0 y, implying that x c y. If x =0E y,
x iE y and x %j y for every j 6= i, then x = y on N0, x i y and x %j y for every j 6= i,
which again means that x c y. So strict determination is satised.
Corollary 1. An event E is believed under %c if and only if it satises strict determination
under %c and i = 0 and there exists a pair x;y with x c
E y under i = 0.
B Type Spaces
We now show that the by now standard construction of all hierarchies of beliefs about
beliefs generates a complete and continuous type structure. Because the types consistent
with event-rationality are mapped to both probability measures and lists, we need to adapt
the standard construction. One route is to follow Epstein and Wang (1995) and work with
more general beliefs about beliefs. Another route, followed bellow, is to construct an auxiliar
complete, continuous and compact type structure, using the standard construction, and then
use it to construct the desired type structure.
Let (X  Li) be the space of all probability measures over X  Li (endowed with the
weak topology) for which the marginal on Li is a mass point, for i = a;b.
35Let 
a
1 = Sb  Lb and T a
1 = (Sb  Lb). Inductively set 
a























Likewise for b. Then the standard arguments in the literature show the existence of compact
spaces T a
 and T b
, with T a
 homeomorphic to (Sb  T b
  Lb) and T b
 homeomorphic to
(Sa  T a
  La).13 In fact, let T a




compact as it is a product of compact spaces. Construct T b
 similarly. Then Theorem 8 in
Heifetz (1993) shows that for each tower (a
k)1





k for all k  1. In particular, the marginal of a on Lb is a mass point, so
a 2 (Sb Lb T b
). Conversely each a 2 (Sb Lb T b
) gives rise to a tower (a
k)1
k=1
given by the list of marginals. So there is a bijection a
 : T a
 ! (SbLbT b
). Theorem 9
in Heifetz (1993) ensures that a
 is a homeomorphism, likewise for b. So we have constructed









 : T i
 ! (Sj  T j






is the point mass at x.
Now set T i = T i




)), for i = a;b. The assignment i
 7! i is a bijection and preserves continuity: i
is continuous if and only if i
 is continuous. Indeed, let ti
 ! ti in T i. This is a converging









) ! `(ti) in the weak
topology if and only if `(ti
) ! `(ti). So ((ti
);`(ti
)) ! ((ti);`(ti)), or i(ti
) ! i(ti), for
i = a;b. A similar argument establishes that i
 is continuous if i is continuous. Moreover, i
is injective and surjective. Hence it is a homeomorphism, as a continuous bijection between






with i : T i ! (Sj T j)Lj for j 6= i = a;b just constructed is complete, continuous and
compact.
It is important to emphasize a conceptual point here. The two players form beliefs about
beliefs about what is relevant for rational choices. That is, Ann has beliefs over SbLb, and
13See for instance Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) and Heifetz (1993).
36these beliefs are given by a conjecture over Sb and a list ` 2 Lb (or, equivalently, a point
mass over Lb.) What is relevant for event-rational choices is precisely the conjecture and
the list. But Ann does not know what Bob's beliefs are, and the hierarchies of beliefs about
beliefs constructed above yield a type structure as the one we use in the paper.
B.1 Lists over Types
We argued in the text that lists over strategies suce for the analysis. Indeed, it is redundant
to include subsets of types in the tie-breaking lists, as types do not play any role in breaking
ties. Also, provided that we consider a rich list of subsets of types, such lists would not
interfere in the constructions in the text that used validated beliefs. Let us now show how to
obtain a type structure with rich lists over strategies and types from a given type structure.
Let the type structure hSi;Li;T i;iii2fa;bg be given. For i 6= j = a;b, let F(T i) denote the
space of all closed subsets of T i, endowed with the Fell topology.14 Say `i(ti) = fE1;:::;Ekg,
with Er  Sj for r = 1;:::;k. Let Er = fs
j
1;:::;sj




K0) : (K;:::;K0) 2 (F(T j))mg, for r = 1;:::;k, where (F(T j))m denotes the product of m
copies of F(T j). Note that Er is compact whenever T j is Hausdor. Finally, put ^ `i(ti) =







where ^ i = (i; ^ `i) and ^ Li is the space of extended lists (as the one constructed above) of
subsets of Si  T i.
Now, for any closed subset F  Sj  T j, we have
F 2 ^ `
i(t
i) , projSjF 2 `
i(t
i):
That is, extended lists do not interfere with statements about validated beliefs. Extended
lists do not interfere with breaking ties either. So the arguments in the text apply to the
corresponding type structure with extended lists with no change (other than notation).
14See for instance Molchanov (2005) for denitions of topologies on spaces of subsets. The nice feature of
the Fell topology is that F(Ti) is compact whenever Ti is Hausdor. When Ti is compact metric, the Fell
topology coincides with the standard Hausdor metric topology.
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